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Abstract
Most of the work in the ¯eld of competition between jurisdictions for the attraction of a large plant
focuses on ¯nancial o®ers, bids or tax holidays. In this paper we add to the competition game an initial
stage in which jurisdictions can invest in an infrastructure capital to enhance their attractiveness and
modify the outcome of the competition stage. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this game. In
an example we show how the parameters of the model change the outcome of the game. In particular,
the size of a jurisdiction is a powerful attraction force for the ¯rm but it can be bypassed by a well
specialized infrastructure capital, even if the competing jurisdiction is big.
1Introduction
The attraction of a large plant by competing jurisdictions can be viewed as
a part of the ¯scal competition literature where the private capital to be invested
in a jurisdiction is indivisible. These models focus on the relationships between
jurisdictions and a ¯rm and especially when the ¯rm is large enough to have
signi¯cative economic e®ects at a local level. In this framework, the large ¯rm
creates a competition between jurisdictions to get the better ¯nancial conditions
for its future localization. The relationships between the jurisdictions and the
¯rm have been modeled through a bidding game between jurisdictions where the
¯rm have all the bargaining power (Black and Hoyt, 1989; King, McAfee and
Welling, 1993; King and Welling, 1992)1. The salient point of this literature is its
e®orts to explain the magnitude and the duration of the tax exemption o®ered
to the large ¯rm. Historically, the duration of the tax exemption has been the
major concern. The tax holiday models (Bond and Samuelson, 1986 ; King and
Welling, 1992; King, McAfee and Welling, 1993) consider that the competition
between jurisdictions and the ability to o®er ¯nancial bids depends mainly on the
dynamics of the mobility of the ¯rm attracted. The ¯xed cost of delocalization
of the ¯rm after its localization enable the jurisdiction to ¯nance its ¯rst stage
tax exemption by a second stage taxation under the constraint that the ¯rm, at
the second stage, is indi®erent between staying in the jurisdiction and leaving the
jurisdiction. In these models, there is no explicit link between the large ¯rm and
the economy of the jurisdiction. Here, the inducement policy of a jurisdiction is
¯nanced by the attracted ¯rm. By explaining the magnitude of tax exemption,
Black and Hoyt (1989), develop a model of competition where the jurisdictions
maximize local welfare and ¯nance their attraction of a large ¯rm by a local
taxation based on the local economic surplus induced by the localization of the
¯rm2. Our work is mainly inspired with the second approach because we it allows
us to link inducements policies with local economic development.
As the emphasis put on the tax instrument is motivated with the widespread
use of ¯nancial o®ers in inducement policies, we think that it covers only one
part of the problem. Public investments in infrastructure capital can be used by
1 Only a pioneering work by Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1994) has explicitly described a more
complex bargaining procedure.
2 In this model, local economies of scale in the production of a public good are the source of the
economic surplus induced by the localization of the ¯rm and are created by the increase in the labor
force and in the number of taxpayers.
2jurisdictions to compete for attracting a ¯rm (Taylor, 1992). As King, McAfee
and Welling (1993) mentioned in their work, investment in infrastructure may
predetermine the condition of attraction in the competition stage and then the
¯nancial o®ers. This idea is consistent with the fact that empirical works on the
e®ect of ¯scal incentives on the location of industries do not present strong evidence
that the tax structure can be a good indicator of the attractiveness of jurisdictions.
Moreover, Helms (1985) consider that focusing only on tax structure does not
allow to describe all the parameters that can a®ect the decision of localization
of the ¯rms. Public goods can have productive e®ects on ¯rms and then have to
be introduced in the model. These matters echoes to the huge empirical literature
about the impact of infrastructure capital on private productivity at national level
(Aschauer, 1989; Berndt and Hansson, 1991; Munnell, 1990b ; Tatom, 1991b ;
Lynde and Richmond, 1993; Conrad and Seitz, 1994; Nadirii and Numuneas, 1994)
but also at regional (Morrisson and Schwartz, 1996; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Costa
and alii, 1987; Munnell, 1990b; Evans and Karras, 1994; Seitz and Licht, 1995;
Garcia-mila and McGuire, 1992) or at the ¯rm level (Shah, 1992; Seitz, 1994). This
economic impact of the infrastructure capital can explain the competition between
regions and the regional relocalization patterns of ¯rms (Seitz and Licht, 1995;
Hulten and Schwab, 1991). Tax exemption and public factors a®ect the location
decision of the ¯rms and have to be introduced in a model of competition between
jurisdiction for the attraction of a ¯rm. As ¯nancial o®ers are powerful incentives
that can be dedicated to a special location project, infrastructure capital, by its
public nature and its ability to be accumulated is a complementary instrument
improves the conditions of realization of economic activities and increases the
pro¯tability of local ¯rms, but also the pro¯tability of the attracted ¯rm. For that
purpose, we built a two stage game where we add to the competition game between
jurisdictions in ¯nancial o®ers a preliminary stage where jurisdictions can make
costly investments in a public infrastructure capital. Introducing an accumulation
process in an infrastructure capital alters the overall competition between the
jurisdictions because we have to take into account both the opportunity to invest
that depends on the outcome of the competition and the opportunity of localization
of the ¯rm that depends on the investments and ¯nancial o®ers of the jurisdiction.
The ¯rst part of the paper is devoted to the characterization of the Nash
equilibrium of this game. We reduce the determination of the investment level
and the ¯nancial o®er to an investment problem. We show that the outcome
of the game, i.e. the localization of the large ¯rm depends both on the pro¯t
maximization of the ¯rm and the welfare objective of the jurisdictions. For each
outcome we exhibits the conditions under which the jurisdictions invest.Given
3these investments, we model the competition game as a two players game where
the reaction function of the jurisdiction takes into account the behavior of the
large ¯rm. We ¯nish this part by considering the conditions under which di®erent
equilibrium con¯gurations may occur. In a second part of the paper, we illustrate
the equilibrium concept by two examples with asymmetric jurisdictions. One
example where the infrastructure is speci¯c to the attracted ¯rm and one when it
is public. In each example we show that the size of a jurisdiction predetermines its
ability to invest and represents a strong attraction force. Under some conditions,
we are able to prove that di®erences in size can be bypassed by a good network
of local ¯rm or a well designed infrastructure capital that may enable the smallest
jurisdiction to attract the large ¯rm.
1. The Model
We consider a two stage game with tree players, a large ¯rm and two
jurisdictions. In a ¯rst stage, each jurisdiction i = fA;Bg can invest in its public
capital Zi
0. The unit cost of investment r is determined in a common market.
Initial endowments of each jurisdiction are given by the pro¯ts of the ¯rms that
are located in it ni¼i(Zi
0). If we consider that each ¯rm sells one unit of a good
on a national market at a unit price of 1, the pro¯t for a given number of ¯rms is
¼i(Zi) = 1¡ci(Zi). Following the literature on the public factors (Kaizuka, 1965;
Boadway, 1973; Henderson, 1974 ; Hillman, 1978; Feehan, 1989; McMillan, 1979a)
we consider that the stock of the public capital is an unpaid factor that reduces the
cost of the ¯rms located in each jurisdiction and creates a rent [ci(0)¡ci(Zi)]3. The
cost of a ¯rm is a decreasing function of the public capital stock ci0(Zi) < 0 and
ci00(Zi) > 0. The unit cost of production is ¯xed, ci(0) = ¹ c. All the economic gains
earned in a jurisdiction are fully distributed in it, and ¯nance overall consumption
of the inhabitants nidi
t and the actions of the local government. A ¯rm is an
entrepreneur, a consumer and a taxpayer. In the ¯rst stage, the balanced budget






In the second stage the large ¯rm wants to locate in one of the two jurisdic-
tions. To attract the large ¯rm, each jurisdiction can make a ¯nancial o®er to the
3 Public capital and especially social overhead capital (education ...) increases the productivity of
private factors of production. In this paper we focus only on economic capital like public infrastructure,
see Diewert (1986) for a complete de¯nition.
4¯rm ­i. The net pro¯t of the large ¯rm is given by ¦i(Zi
1) + ­i. Two balanced
budget conditions have to be considered at the local level :
- If the large ¯rm locates in the jurisdiction :
ni~ ¼i(Zi
1) = nidi





One can notice that the location of the large ¯rm modi¯es the pro¯ts of the local
¯rms ~ ¼i(Zi) = 1 ¡ ~ ci(Zi). We consider that ~ ci0(Zi) < 0 and ~ ci00(Zi) > 0. This
variation of the pro¯ts can be explained by the interactions between local ¯rms
and the large ¯rm through technological spillovers, induced economic e®ects or
agglomeration e®ects4. This local surplus created by the location of the large ¯rm
draw a link between the attraction policy and the local economic development5.
For the large ¯rm, the balanced budget condition is given by :
¦i(Zi
1) + ­i = Di
1 (4)
The pro¯t function of the large ¯rm is de¯ned by ¦i(Zi) = 1 ¡ Ci(Zi) with
Ci0(Zi) < 0 and Ci00(Zi) > 0.
At the end, the large ¯rm locates in the jurisdiction where it earns the highest
net pro¯t. The unfolding of the game can be illustrated by the following ¯gure :
Graphique 1 : Unfolding of the game
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To explain the competition between jurisdictions and the impact of public
capital and the ¯nancial o®ers, we have to de¯ne their objective functions. Follow-
ing Black and Hoyt (1989) we suppose that each jurisdiction try to maximize the
welfare of its inhabitants. We measure the local welfare by the total consumption
in the jurisdiction nidi
t. The welfare function is given by the discounted sum of





4 In this paper we do not model these interactions to concentrate our attention on the attraction
game and we deal only with positive e®ects.
5 Black and Hoyt (1989) consider that this surplus come from economies of scale in the production
of the public good induced by the increase in the number of workers, taxpayers in the jurisdiction.
5The levels of consumption in the second stage depend on the outcome of the
competition between the jurisdictions, i.e the location decision of the large ¯rm.
If we use equations (1), (2) and (3) to replace the consumption levels by their
equivalents, the local welfare is a function of the public capital Zi
1, the ¯nancial














Where ei = 1, if the large ¯rm locates in i, ei = 0 else.
The competition for the attraction of the ¯rm in the second stage leads to
the strategic determination of the level of the ¯nancial o®er ­i given the stock of
infrastructure in each jurisdiction at the beginning of the stage. These ¯nancial
o®ers are functions of the current stock of infrastructure. To set the level of its
bid, a jurisdiction compares the total surplus created by the location of the ¯rm





The welfare of a jurisdiction i is directly increased by the wealth of the new
located ¯rm ¦i(Zi
1), but also indirectly by the induced economic surplus over all
inhabitants Bi(Zi
1) = ni[~ ¼i(Zi
1)¡¼i(Zi
1)]. The function Bi(Zi
1) also gives the value
of the maximal bid of a jurisdiction. At this maximum, a jurisdiction can o®er all
the induced economic surplus. Alternatively, the function T i(Zi
1) can be viewed as
the maximal gain of the large ¯rm when it locates in the jurisdiction i.
A jurisdiction has no incentives to give all its induced economic surplus to the
¯rm if it sets its bid so as to made the ¯rm indi®erent between the two locations6.
The surplus remaining in a jurisdiction is the di®erence between the total surpluses,
T i(Zi
1) ¡ T j(Z
j
1)7. Let us note Qi (i = A;B) the level of investment in the stock
of infrastructure. As Zi
1 = Zi
0 + Qi, we can rewrite the objective function of a
jurisdiction i as a function of the decision of investment in the ¯rst stage :
V
i(Qi;Qj) = ni¼i(Zi











6 This procedure of determination of the bids is identical to a second price sealed bid auction
(Black and Hoyt, 1989; King, Welling and McA®ee, 1992 and 1993).
7 The ¯nancial o®er ­i = Tj(Z
j
1) ¡ ¦i(Zi
1) is a decreasing function of the investment in the stock
of infrastructure. The determination of the bid can be described in the following ¯gure. The bid is
positive if TB > FA (Figure a) and negative if TB < FA (Figure b).
62. Equilibrium
The optimization problem can be de¯ned as the setting of the optimal level
of the investment in the stock of infrastructure under the budget constraint, given
the investment of the competing jurisdiction. The optimization program depends
on the hypothetic outcome of the competition between the two jurisdictions. This
hypothetic outcome is determined by the preferences of the large ¯rm and by the
willingness to invest of the jurisdictions. The attraction of a ¯rm have an implicit
price, in terms of investment required, that can be too high in some case.
A jurisdiction is attractive for a large ¯rm if the maximal gain that it can
earn in the jurisdiction is greater than in the other :
Ti(Zi
1) ¡ T j(Z
j
1) ¸ 0 (6)
Depending on the value of the attractiveness constraint (6) a jurisdiction has to
consider two cases.
- If the jurisdiction i (i = A;B) wants to attract the large ¯rm, it sets its optimal
investment Qi
¤
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0 + Qi) ¡ T j(Z
j
0 + Qj) ¸ 0 g(i)
- If the jurisdiction i does not want to attract the ¯rm, it sets its optimal
investment Qi¤
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0 + Qj) ¡ T i(Zi
0 + Qi) > 0 p(i)
7The constraint d(i) implies that a jurisdiction cannot invest more than it can








Inequalities g(i) and p(i) are attractiveness constraints that describe the location
decision of the large ¯rm.
In this description we have omitted the second condition of attraction. A
jurisdiction i will want to attract a large ¯rm if the welfare obtained after the
location of the ¯rm (program W i) is greater than the welfare obtained if the
jurisdiction does not attract the ¯rm (program Li). Depending on the value
of the investment of the competing jurisdiction j, the local authorities have
to change their investment decisions but can also choose di®erent optimization
program. The two optimization programs are linked. The determination of the
level of investment in the infrastructure stock, best reply to the investment of the
competing jurisdiction, is complexi¯ed by the strategic interactions that passes
through the attractiveness constraints.
DEFINITION 1 : An equilibrium of this attraction game is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in the levels of infrastructure investments. At the Nash equilibrium
the winning jurisdiction wants to attract the large ¯rm and the large ¯rm wants
to locate in this jurisdiction.
In ¯rst period the jurisdictions have to determine non cooperatively their
investment levels anticipating the outcome of the second period subgame. The
second period is a bidding game between the two jurisdictions that try to attract
the large ¯rm with ¯nancial o®ers. The equilibrium of this subgame requires that
a jurisdiction wants to attract the large ¯rm and the ¯rm wants to locate in the
jurisdiction. We will show that this coincidence of interests can be reduced to the
satisfaction of the jurisdiction objective : if a jurisdiction wants to attract the large
¯rm, then the ¯rm wants to locate in this jurisdiction. The consequence is that
the bidding subgame can be reduced to a subgame between the two jurisdictions.
As the bids depends on the initial investments, the equilibrium of the game is
determined by the optimal investment strategy of the jurisdictions, in terms of
restricted reaction functions.
To construct the restricted best reply functions we have to describe how
jurisdictions set their investment levels depending on the possible outcome of the
competition. We ¯rst consider light optimization programs where attractiveness
constraint have not been introduced. We obtain the hypothesis under which the
levels of investment can be determined. Second, we describe the selection procedure
8of the level of investment that depends on the value of the attractiveness constraint
and of the value of the objective function in the two light optimization programs.
This selection will give the restricted best reply functions that enable us to describe
all the equilibrium con¯gurations.
2.1. Restricted best reply functions
A jurisdiction wins the competition and makes the required investments if
the jurisdiction wants to attract the ¯rm and if the large ¯rm wants to locate
in the jurisdiction. In a ¯rst stage, we will study the investment decision of
the jurisdiction without taking into account these constraints. To carry out this
study we restrict the game by considering only the jurisdictionds and de¯ne light
optimization programs with respect to the outcomes of the competition between
jurisdictions :
- The jurisdiction i is attractive for the large ¯rm and wants to welcome it. It
sets its investment in infrastructure Qi
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i
d(i)
- The jurisdiction i is not attractive for the large ¯rm and sets its investment
Qi
L as the solution of the following light optimization program :
(Li)
8
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Lg are not functions of the investments made by the
jurisdiction j, because the objective function of the jurisdiction i is additively
separable with respect to Qj8. The values of the solutions depends both on the
hypothesis about the economic pro¯tability of the infrastructure capital and the
magnitude of the induced economic e®ects created by the location of the ¯rm. Let
us precise these hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 : The function V
i
L(Qi) is concave with respect to Qi and admits




8 To be convinced, the reader can refer to the examples of Section 3.
9The program (Li) admits an interior solution Qi




























Then we must have :
0 < Qi

















We obtain these relations because ci00(Zi) > 0 and ¼i00(Zi) < 0.
This hypothesis have two implications. First, for a given initial stock of infras-
tructure Zi
0, the net pro¯ts of a marginal investment in the stock are positive.
The condition (H1.a) make a link between the size of the jurisdiction and the
pro¯tability of the public investment, given the initial stock.
Second, the condition (H1.b) says that a jurisdiction have no incentives to
invest all its ¯nancial resources in the infrastructure stock because the marginal
bene¯ts of infrastructure are decreasing with the level of investment.
An optimal investment exists and satisfy the budget constraint. This optimal
investment is found where the marginal social bene¯ts are equals to the discounted
marginal costs. The hypothesis 1 is an existence condition for an investment that
satisfy the samuelsonian condition for public factors (Kaizuka, 1965; Sandmo,
1972).
Hypothesis 2 : If the large ¯rm locates in the jurisdiction i, the overall economic
surplus Ti(Zi
1) is an increasing function of the stock of infrastructure :
ni @~ ¼
@Qi(Zi
0 + Qi) +
@¦i
@Qi(Zi
0 + Qi) > 0 8Qi 2 [0;Q
i
] i = A;B
The investment in infrastructure expand the induced e®ects produced by the
location of the large ¯rm. One can think about infrastructure that enhances
transports, communication networks or that reduces negative externalities (noise,
pollution...).
Hypothesis 3 : The function V
i
W(Qi;Qj) is strictly concave with respect to Qi




10The program (W i) admits an interior solution Qi





































To check the condition about the admissible values of Qi determined by B(i), it is
su±cient to have :
0 < Qi

























To be valid these conditions rely on the assumption that T00(Zi) < 0, which is
satis¯ed because ~ ¼00(Zi) < 0 and ¦i00(Zi) < 0. We have assumed in the Hy-
pothesis 2 that @T i=@Qi ¸ 0. Then it is necessary that the marginal pro¯tability
of the infrastructure do not increase too much if this condition have to be satis¯ed.
The condition (H3.b) will be di±cult to be satis¯ed if the attracted ¯rm is
a large unit whose produce signi¯cative economic induced e®ects. To be able to
take into account this kind of situation we have to de¯ne an alternative to the
hypothesis 3.


















The attraction of the large ¯rm is highly pro¯table for the jurisdiction because
the expected social bene¯ts go beyond the costs of investment. In this situation,
a jurisdiction invests all its ¯nancial resources to attract the ¯rm. It is a stronger
assumption that the assumption made in [H3], but we think that it covers some
situations experienced by small jurisdictions that compete for a big ¯rm9.
9 The location of a big ¯rm can generate such induced economic e®ects that the ¯nancial o®ers to
this ¯rm does not satisfy the budget constraint of the jurisdiction. In these cases, the public authorities
of higher level often give their ¯nancial support. This case of interest is not modeled.
11Hypothesis 5 : The program (Li) admits a corner solution, such that Qi
L = 0.
This hypothesis is based on [H1], when we suppose that the jurisdiction made
speci¯c investment for the large ¯rm. In this case the function V
i
L does not
depend on Qi. When the large ¯rm does not locate in the jurisdiction the optimal
investment is Qi
L = 0. This case will be use as a benchmark in the example.
All these hypothesis de¯ne the following properties :
[P1] : Qi




[P2] : Positive e®ect of infrastructure :
@T i(Zi












[P5] : Minimal admissible investment for the program (Li) : Qi
L = 0.




LEMMA 1 : Under [P1] and [P2] (or [P5] and [P2]) we have :
Qi
W > Qi
L i = A;B
PROOF : Let us de¯ne the function :
¢i(Qi) = ni @¼i
@Qi(Zi
0 + Qi) ¡
r
½
~ ¢i(Qi) = ni @¼i
@Qi(Zi
0 + Qi) +
@Ti
@Qi(Zi







The property [P1] implies that :
¢i(Qi
L) = 0
With this equation and [P2] we have :






As the pro¯t functions are concave, the function T i is concave too, so :
@ ~ ¢i
@Qi < 0 ) Qi
W > Qi
L i = A;B
12Given the value of the optimal investment in each situation we can de¯ne the best
reply function for each jurisdiction by the following proposition :
PROPOSITION 1 : Given the lemma 1 and under [P1], [P2] and [P3] (or [P5],
[P2] and [P3]) the optimal investment for a jurisdiction, given the investment of
the other, can take two value depending on the outcome of the competition for the
attraction of the large ¯rm.
i 6= j; Qi¤ =
(
Qi
W; if 0 < Qj · ~ Qj
Qi
L; if ~ Qj < Qj < Q
j
















PROOF : To prove this proposition, we start with the jurisdiction A. Results for the
jurisdiction B are alike.
To construct the retricted best reply function for the jurisdiction A, QA¤ =
RA(QB) we consider two situations depending on the values taken by QB. These
situations are determined by a double condition. If we take the best issue.
i) the ¯rm wants to locate in the jurisdiction i. The net surplus for the local
¯rms after the attraction of the ¯rm is positive as in (6).
ii) the jurisdiction i wants to attract the ¯rm. The welfare in the jurisdiction
where the large ¯rm locates have to be greater than the welfare in this
jurisdiction if the large ¯rm does not locate so as to incite the jurisdiction
to attract the ¯rm.
Let us focus on the condition ii). The condition ii) is ful¯lled, the jurisdiction
will invest Qi
W. Else, the jurisdiction will invest Qi
L. The jurisdiction A wants to








With : = (QA
L;QA








W) ¡ HA ¸ 0







ÁA(:;QB) = ½[T A(ZA
0 + QA
W) ¡ T B(ZB
0 + QB)] ¡ HA ¸ 0
13The condition Ái ¸ 0 implies that the condition i) is ful¯lled. As Hi > 0, the
condition Ái ¸ 0 implies that T i(Zi
0 + Qi
W) ¡ T j(Z
j
0 + Qj) ¸ 0
The threshold ~ QB is the level of investment of the competing jurisdiction that
let the jurisdiction A indi®erent between investing QA
W to attract the large ¯rm
or not attracting the ¯rm. The level ~ QB is the solution of the following equation :
ÁA(:;QB) = ½[T A(ZA
0 + QA
W) ¡ T B(ZB
0 + QB)] ¡ HA = 0
Then,











We know that the function ÁA(:;QB) is a decreasing function of QB. The two
areas over which the best reply function is constructed are determined by the
position of QB with respect to ~ QB :
- If QB · ~ QB then ÁA(QA
W;QB) ¸ 0 and the best reply for the jurisdiction A
is given by the solution of the program (WA) : QA
W.
- If QB > ~ QB then ÁA(QA
W;QB) < 0 and the best reply for the jurisdiction A
is given by the solution of the program (LA) : QA
L.
The restricted best reply function is a piecewise constant function with two




L are additively separable with
respect to the investment of the jurisdiction B10. The following ¯gure gives an
illustration of the construction of a reaction function11.
Graphique 2 : Best reply functions
10 The pro¯t function only varies with the stock of infrastructure located in their jurisdiction. We
suppose that there are no spillovers between jurisdictions or that the infrastructure do not a®ect the
competition between ¯rms on the market for products. The later case where location are endogenously
determined have been studied by Markusen, Morey et Olewiler (1994) and more speci¯cally by Richter
(1994), in the presence of public factors.
11 To simplify we consider a linear attraction constraint.
14The proposition says that the investment of a jurisdiction depends on the
outcome of the game, ie. the locational choice of the large ¯rm. But this outcome
does not depends only on the preference of the ¯rm between localization. The
jurisdiction has to be incited to attract the ¯rm and to invest. So there exists cases
where a ¯rm could locate in a jurisdiction if it invests QW, but the jurisdiction
does not want to attract the ¯rm and invests QL. Depending on the value taken






L). In this situation, the attraction of
the large ¯rm is too costly for the jurisdiction A. The jurisdiction A will not want
to invest to attract the ¯rm12. The consequence of the proposition, is that the
jurisdiction wants to invest to attract the large ¯rm if the local surplus created by
the coming of the large ¯rm is greater than the potential loss of welfare induced
by the ¯nancing of a higher level of infrastructure capital. This situation is de¯ned
by the condition ÁA(:;QB) ¸ 0.
We can also remark that if the condition ÁA(:;QB) ¸ 0, we have necessary
that T A(ZA
0 +QA)¡TB(ZB
0 +QB) > 0. If a jurisdiction wants to attract the large
¯rm, then the large ¯rm wants to locate in the jurisdiction. So, the problem of the
localization of the large ¯rm is embodied in the problem of setting the right level
of investment in the infrastructure capital by the competing jurisdictions.
COROLLARY 1.1 : Under [P1], [P2] and [P4] (or [P5], [P2] and [P4]) the optimal
investment for a jurisdiction, given the investment of the other, is equal to :




; if 0 < Qj · ~ Qj
Qi
L; if ~ Qj < Qj < Q
j
2.2. Equilibrium con¯gurations and selection
To describe the outcome of the competition we have to know if a jurisdiction
attracts the ¯rm when it plays its optimal strategy, given the optimal strategy
of the competing jurisdiction. As there are two possible investment levels for the
two jurisdictions (Qi
W;Qi
L), i = fA;Bg, four con¯gurations can be considered. We
will says that a con¯guration is \normal" (con¯guration 1 and 2) if the outcome
of the competition leads to an equilibrium where one jurisdiction invests Qi
W and
the other invests Q
j
L, 8i 6= j.
12 This phenomenon, where a jurisdiction renounces to invest for the attraction of the large ¯rm is
not taking into account in the model of King, Welling and McA®ee (1993), because the jurisdictions
do not have positive and endogenous reservation utility in the competition.
15Graphique 3 : "Normal" Equilibria
We can exhibits two special con¯gurations : one where the two jurisdictions
may invest to attract the ¯rm (con¯guration 3), and one where no jurisdiction
wants to invest to attract the ¯rm (con¯guration 4).
Graphique 4 : "Special" equilibria
A careful study of these con¯gurations leads to the following propositions.




L) does not exist.
PROOF : Let us prove that the jurisdiction can play (Qi
L;Q
j
L). To be correct, this



























0 + Qi) ¡ T j(Z
j
0 + Qj)]
Let us assume that, for (Qi
L;Q
j
L) and for the jurisdiction i13 we have :
Ti(Zi
1L) ¡ T j(Z
j
1L) ¸ 0










1L) ¡ T j(Z
j
1L) ¸ 0
Under [P3] or [P4], Qi
W is the investment where V
i






















L) ¸ 0. Contradiction.
We have constructed the best response functions so as to embody the location
decision of the large ¯rm. When a jurisdiction want to attract a ¯rm, the ¯rm
want to locate in the jurisdiction. To be consistent, this construction, based on the
decision of the jurisdictions, implies that there is always a jurisdiction that want
to attract the large ¯rm. This proposition shows that it is the case because the
large ¯rm will always locate in a jurisdiction14.
PROPOSITION 3 : Given the proposition 2, there exists always a jurisdiction i for
which the winning outcome W i = (Qi
W;Q
j
L) is a Nash equilibrium of the attraction
game.
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13 Same argument apply for j.
14 In our model, we implicitly assume that the reservation pro¯t of the large ¯rm is zero.
17PROOF : Let us assume that15 :
Ti(Zi
1L) ¡ T j(Z
j
1L) ¸ 0







L) ¸ 0. This condition is equivalent to Q
j
L < ~ Qj.
Two equilibrium con¯gurations can occur depending on the position of Qi
L with
respect to ~ Qi.
- If Qi
L > ~ Qi then Áj(Q
j
W ;Qi
L) < 0. Facing Q
j
L, the best reply for the
jurisdiction j is Q
j




In this con¯guration, (Qi
W ;Q
j
L) is an equilibrium if (Q
j
W ;Qi
L) is not an
equilibrium.
- If Qi
L ¸ ~ Qi then Áj(Q
j
W ;Qi
L) ¸ 0. Then it is possible that the jurisdiction
plays Q
j
W. There are two equilibria.
In the ¯rst case, this proposition describes the conditions under which only one
winning Nash equilibrium exists for a jurisdiction (con¯guration 1 and 2). A
jurisdiction attract the large ¯rm if two conditions are satis¯ed. The large ¯rm
wants to locate in the jurisdiction and the jurisdiction wants to invest Qi
W in
the infrastructure capital to welcome the ¯rm. Depending on the value of the
investments, the second part of the proposition exhibits conditions under which
two winning equilibria may exist (con¯guration 3).
The location of the large ¯rm is di±cult to anticipate because of the relative
position of the attraction constraints with the values of the stocks of the jurisdic-
tions. These factors depends directly on the relative size of the jurisdiction, thus
on the ¯scal resources of each jurisdiction, and on the pro¯tability of each sites
for the ¯rm, measured by the gross pro¯t Fj(Z
j
1). The outcome of the competi-
tion can be modi¯ed indirectly by the magnitude of the induced e®ects created
by the location of the ¯rm in each jurisdiction. These factors are resumed by the
magnitude of the function Bj(Z
j
1) which is the maximal value of the bid that a
jurisdiction can made to induce the large ¯rm to locate. The outcome of the com-
petition is pre-determined by the setting of the level of the infrastructure capital
which depend also on the willing to invest of each jurisdiction. To clarify the mag-
nitude and the signi¯cance of each factor we characterize the equilibrium of this
game in two examples.
15 The reverse inequality holds for j.
183. Characterization of the equilibrium
To keep the analysis as simple as possible we consider that the jurisdiction do
not have any infrastructure installed at the initial stage, Zi
0 = 0. The investment
is also the stock of infrastructure capital : Zi ´ Zi
1 = Qi.
If the large ¯rm is not attracted, the ¯rms initially located in the jurisdiction i
have the following cost function :
ci(Zi) = ¹ c ¡ 2gip
Zi
Their pro¯t function is :
¼i(Zi) = 1 ¡ ci(Zi) = 1 ¡ ¹ c + 2gip
Zi
The parameter gi is a measure of the adaptation of the infrastructure capital to
the activity of the ¯rm. We assume that the ¯rms initially installed in a juris-
diction share the same parameter. Di®erences in the pro¯t between jurisdictions
come from di®erences in the level and the adaptation of the infrastructure capital.
The pro¯t of the residents when the large ¯rm locate in their jurisdiction is given
by :
~ ¼i(Zi) = 1 ¡ ~ ci(Zi) = 1 ¡ ¹ c + ~ ci + 2gip
Zi
with the cost :
~ ci(Zi) = (¹ c ¡ ~ ci) ¡ 2gip
Zi
The localization of the large ¯rm generates economies of agglomeration induced
by a physical or a technological proximity with the ¯rms initially located in
the jurisdiction. These agglomeration e®ects, like marshallian type of externality,
reduce the unit cost of production of the ¯rms located in the selected jurisdiction
by ~ ci.
The pro¯t of the large ¯rm is given by :
¦i(Zi) = 1 ¡ ¹ Ci + 2Gip
Zi
A location speci¯c parameter ¹ Ci change the cost of the large ¯rm because of
di®erent dotation in resources or amenities. The adaptation parameter of the
infrastructure capital for the large ¯rm is given by Gi . The value of this parameter
is determined by speci¯c factors in each jurisdiction that allow a better use of the
stock of infrastructure.
19The surplus remaining in a jurisdiction after the localization of the large ¯rm is :
T i(Zi) ¡ T j(Zj) =2Gip
Zi ¡ 2Gjp
Zj
+ (ni~ ci ¡ nj~ cj) + ( ¹ Cj ¡ ¹ Ci)
Two types of cost di®erentials modify the magnitude of this surplus. An internal
di®erential ¢I = (ni~ ci ¡ nj~ cj) that measures the ability of the ¯rms initially
located in a jurisdiction to take advantage of the attraction of the large ¯rm. An
external di®erential ¢X = ( ¹ Cj ¡ ¹ Ci) that measures the economies of localization
that the large ¯rm earns when it locates in the jurisdiction i rather than j. The
infrastructure capital and its adaptation for the attracted ¯rm in each jurisdiction
modi¯es also the surplus. This surplus can be rewritten :
Ti(Zi) ¡ Tj(Zj) = 2Gip
Zi ¡ 2Gjp
Zj + ¢I + ¢X (8)
3.1. The speci¯c investment case
We begin with a simple example to study the method of characterization of the
equilibrium. Let us assume that the jurisdictions invest in a speci¯c infrastructure
that is dedicated to the large ¯rm. In this case the infrastructure capital is not
public and we focus on the competition and on the role of the impact of the
localization of the large ¯rm on ¯rms initially located in the jurisdiction.
There is no marginal bene¯t of the infrastructure capital for local ¯rms,
gi = 0;8i. The pro¯t function of the local ¯rms are :
¼i = 1 ¡ ¹ c
~ ¼i = 1 ¡ (¹ c ¡ ~ ci)
To simplify, we assume that the unit cost for the large ¯rm does not depend of its
location : ¹ C = ¹ Ci = ¹ Cj. The total economic surplus in the jurisdiction i is :
T i(Zi) = ¦i(Zi) + ni(~ ¼i ¡ ¼i) = (1 ¡ ¹ C) + 2Gip
Zi + ni~ ci
Using (8), we get the following surplus after the attraction :
Ti(Zi) ¡ Tj(Zj) = 2(Gip
Zi ¡ Gjp
Zj) + ni~ ci ¡ nj~ cj
3.1.1. Investment levels
20Each jurisdiction, sets its investment for the two issues. In the case where
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L(Zi) = (1 + ½)ni¼i ¡ rZi
st
0 · Zi · Z
i
d(i)
In the speci¯c investment case, there is no gain to invest in the infrastructure
capital when the large ¯rm does not come. So hypothesis [H5] apply and we get :
Zi
L = 0
The investment will be positive, only in the issue where the large ¯rm locate in
the jurisdiction. In the case where the jurisdiction is attractive the investment is
the solution of the following light optimization program :
(W i)
8
> > > <




W(Zi;Zj) = (1 + ½)ni¼i ¡ rZi + ½
£
T i(Zi) ¡ T j(Zj)
¤
st
0 · Zi · Z
i
d(i)








This investment does not depend on the initial population of a jurisdiction or its
¯scal resources. The level of the investment depends on the pro¯tability of the
infrastructure for the large ¯rm and its cost for the jurisdiction. In this case we
have to check the domain condition to be sure that the jurisdiction have enough
¯scal resources (population) to ¯nance its investment. Using (9) and (7) we deduce
that a jurisdiction will invest Zi
W if and only if :
ni >
(½Gi)2
r¼i = ¹ ni
Otherwise, we apply the hypothesis [H4] and following (7) the investment is :
Zi
W = Z = ni¼i
r
3.1.2. Equilibrium
21We have check the conditions of attraction Ái for di®erent values of the parameters
and characterize the di®erent equilibrium con¯gurations.
PROPOSITION 4 : With speci¯c investment, if :
ni >
1
r¼i(½Gi)2 = ~ ni
there is always one winning equilibrium :
i) There is one winning Nash equilibrium for the jurisdiction i if :
ni >
~ cj




ii) There are two Nash equilibria if :
~ cj
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We get the following system of inequalities :










22Only the condition (b) must hold. After some manipulation we get the condition
i) of the proposition.
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Some calculations lead to the conditions ii) of the proposition.




L) < 0 and Áj(Z
j
W;Zi
L) < 0 are not compatible.
As population plays an important role in the model by determining the ¯scal
resources that can be devoted to the investment in the initial stage but also the
magnitude of the induced welfare e®ect created by the location of the ¯rm that is
used to ¯nance the attraction policy of a jurisdiction, it is interesting to know how
the size of the populations may a®ect the issue of the competition. The following
¯gure illustrates the proposition in this perspective.
Graphique 5 : Specific Investment Equilibria
The areas W A and WB that lies over ÁB = 0 and under ÁA = 0 depicts all
the situations where, for a given set of parameters, the size of the jurisdictions
allows one to attract the large ¯rm. The area 1 is the area where the populations
do not allow the jurisdictions to ¯nance their investments. In the area 2, the size
of the jurisdictions lead to multiple equilibria (condition ii) of the proposition 4.
The area 3 is the set of unique winning equilibria for the jurisdiction B such that
the size of its population is lower than i.
23The size of the areas W i depends on the levels of the parameters Gi and
~ ci. As the productivity of the infrastructure capital of the competing jurisdiction
GB increases, it shifts upward the attraction constraint ÁB and shrink the area
W A. In this case, the jurisdiction A wins only if its size increases, given the size
of the competing jurisdiction. More productive infrastructure capital is a way to
a®ect competition. A jurisdiction can increase the productivity by adapting the
infrastructure to the activity of the attracted ¯rm. In this context, the speci¯city
of the infrastructure capital is an attraction force. As it is possible to dedicate
some infrastructure to a large ¯rm, it is more di±cult to adapt an exiting stock
and to exploit strategically this °exibility16. This part of the proposition focus
on the impact of the targeting of the investment in infrastructure on the issue of
competition.
As the size of ~ ci increases, the slope of the attraction constraint Ái increases
and the area W i shrinks. When the induced welfare e®ect created by the attraction
of the ¯rm increases, the competitiveness of the jurisdiction j increases, because it
allows the jurisdiction j to collect more ¯nancial resources in the second stage and
have stronger attraction policy. The relative size of these induced e®ects, can be
an opportunity for a jurisdiction to compete successfully with a larger jurisdiction.
This idea is formalized in the following corollary.
COROLLARY 4.1 : If ~ cj > ~ ci there exists a threshold :




~ cj ¡ ~ ci
over which the smaller jurisdiction may attract the large ¯rm.
PROOF : The result follow directly from the condition (a) of the proposition 4,
when ni = nj.
This corollary put the emphasis on the internal composition of the industry in
the jurisdiction. As induced e®ects are more likely to be supported by Marshallian
type of external economies, specialized territories can expect to develop more larger
induced e®ects, if the internal specialization is closely related to the activity of the
attracted ¯rm. The corollary says that this kind of jurisdiction may attract a large
¯rm despite a smaller industry size. The corollary exhibit also that a minimum
agglomeration of ¯rms is needed at the local level for this case to occur. Successful
attraction policy based on investments in speci¯c infrastructure needs a minimal
16 One can think about divisible premises...
24size in the population. This minimal size decrease as the magnitude of the induced
e®ect in the smaller jurisdiction increases with respect to the other jurisdiction.
3.2. The public investment case
In this section we assume that the infrastructure capital have positive e®ects
both on the large ¯rm and on the ¯rms already located in the jurisdiction (gi 6= 0).
In this case, even if the large ¯rm is not attracted, there exist incentives to invest.
3.2.1. Investment levels
We calculate the investment levels solution of the programs (L) and (W) so
as to built the reaction functions. We begin by the case where the jurisdiction is
not attractive.
LEMMA 2 : When :
ni <
r(1 ¡ ¹ c)
(½gi)2 ; (8)






PROOF : The investment of a jurisdiction when it losses is given by the ¯rst order



















To get the property [P1] we have to check the conditions (H1.a) et (H1.b). The





















1 ¡ ¹ c
r
ni
If we replace Z
i
by its value in the preceding condition we get the condition (8).
The interior maximum that ful¯lls the condition (H1) is given by the equation
(9).
The existence of an interior maximum for the program (L) depends on a restriction
on the size of the population initially located in each jurisdiction. Let us calculate
the investment of a jurisdiction i when it is attractive.
LEMMA 3 : When the jurisdiction i is attractive,





(nigi + Gi)]2 (10)


















and K = 2giGi ¡
½
2
r (1 ¡ ¹ c) and ± = r
½(1 ¡ ¹ c)[ r
½ ¡ 4giGi]. .
PROOF : The investment of a jurisdiction when it wins is given by the ¯rst order

































We get an interior maximum if the condition (H3.b) is ful¯lled or a corner solution
if the condition (H4.b) holds. To determine which condition holds we have to study











26If this expression is negative, (H3.b) holds, else it is (H4.b). Let us write this ex-
pression for our example. After some calculation we get the following polynomial :
(gini)2 + [2giGi ¡
½
r
(1 ¡ ¹ c)]ni + Gi2
if r











with K = 2giGi ¡
½2
r (1 ¡ ¹ c) and ± = r
½(1 ¡ ¹ c)[ r
½ ¡ 4giGi].
Between the roots the polynomial is negative, (H3.b) holds and we have an interior
maximum given by (H3). Outside the roots the expression is positive, the condition
(H4.b) is ful¯lled and we get an a corner solution ¹ Qi.
When the jurisdiction i is attractive two cases can occur : the investment is
interior or the jurisdiction invest all this ¯nancial resources. The corner solution
can occur when the relative size of the attracted ¯rm is important or the size of
the jurisdiction and the economic e®ects induced by the location of the ¯rm are
important.
At the contrary of the speci¯c investment case, the infrastructure levels
depends on the size of the jurisdiction because the opportunity to invest is given by
the tradeo® between the social pro¯tability of the project and its social cost. The
social pro¯tability of the project is measured by the marginal bene¯t produced by
one unit of infrastructure, (nigi + Gi).
3.2. Equilibrium Characterization
To simplify the characterization of the equilibrium we assume that the size of
the attracted ¯rm is large enough to impose the property [P4]. So the e®ects of the
localization of the large ¯rm are so important that the winning jurisdiction invests
all its ¯nancial resources in the infrastructure capital Zi
W = Zi. Let us apply the
condition of the lemma 7 and ful¯ll the condition (H4.B). The investments are











1 ¡ ¹ c
r
) ni i = A;B
The localization of the large ¯rm, and the Nash equilibrium, are determined by the
balance between many parameters : The location speci¯c amenities, the economic
27e®ects induced by the localization of the large ¯rm on local ¯rms and the impact
of the infrastructure capital on the large ¯rm pro¯t. The following proposition
characterize the Nash equilibrium of this attraction game with respect to these
parameters.
PROPOSITION 5 : The jurisdiction i attract the large ¯rm if :
. The cost di®erentials are in favor of i :
¢ = ¢I + ¢X · 0 ;
. the marginal productivity of the infrastructure capital for the attracted ¯rm is




















. and the unit cost of investment is su±ciently low.
PROOF : We take a normal equilibrium con¯guration and we express the conditions
that insures i to win. We have to ful¯ll the conditions (C3.a) and (C3.b) of the
proposition 3.
The ¯rst condition implies that the jurisdiction j have no interest to attract
the ¯rm, that is equivalent to the condition Zi
L > ^ Zi. This condition always
holds if T j(Z
j
W) ¡ T i(Z
j
W) < 0. We can rewrite the attraction condition in
the (Zj;Zi) space as an implicit function Zj = 'j(Zi) de¯ned by the equation







Zi ¡ ¢]2 avec ¢ = ¢I + ¢X





























28Let us assume :
¢ · 0
This assumption implies the following condition on the populations nj=ni · ~ ci=~ cj.


















The second condition that have to be ful¯lled is that the jurisdiction i wants to
attract the ¯rm, Z
j
L < ~ Zj, or Ái(Zi
W;Z
j























L ¡ ¢ ¡ r(Zi
L + Zi
W) > 0
As we know that Zi
W > Zi
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The discriminant of the polynomial is :
± = 4(½nigi)2 + 8½2nigiGi + 4(½Gi)2 ¡ 16½2njgjGj > 0
A su±cient condition for this discriminant to be positive is :










29The product of the roots is positive, so the roots are of the same sign and are
positives. Then we can deduce that the attraction condition for the jurisdiction i












with K = 2½[nigi + Gi ¡ 4½njgjGi].









8ni(1 ¡ ¹ c)
This proposition says that the jurisdiction with the greater size may not at-
tract the large ¯rm if the competing jurisdiction have a well de¯ned infrastructure
capital and set of local ¯rms. If the size of a jurisdiction is a key factor that de-
termine the amount of the investment (see corollary 3.1), the setting-up of the
local ¯rms determines also the economic surplus that can be devoted to the at-
traction of the large ¯rm. Thus, the costs di®erentials and the di®erence between
the adaptation of the infrastructure capital to the activity of the large ¯rm may
overcome a relative small size. The cost of investment plays also an important role
because it determines the incentives of a jurisdiction to invest to attract the large
¯rm. If the cost of investment is too high then the small jurisdiction will not want
to invest as much as it is necessary to overcome the investment of the competing
jurisdiction. Then the competition is too high with the larger jurisdiction.
If we ¯x the investment cost, a prior disadvantage in the size can be bypassed
by two ways. The ¯rst depends on the localization attributes. The ¯rm, when
it locates in a jurisdiction can bene¯t from amenities that reduce its cost. The
location of the large ¯rm creates spillovers in the jurisdiction that increase the
¯nancial resources devoted to the attraction policy. The second depends on the
adaptation of the stock of infrastructure to the activity of the ¯rm. Let us consider
that the two jurisdictions are identical with respect to their amenities (¢ = 0). In
this case the greater is the adaptation of the stock of infrastructure to the large
¯rm, the better the small jurisdiction can overcome its disadvantage in size. The
direct impact of the stock of infrastructure on the large ¯rm is determinant.
This point shed light on two problems. Small jurisdictions can attract a large ¯rm
only if their infrastructure capital is well specialized and if it correspond to the
needs of the large ¯rm. Large jurisdictions with a diversi¯ed stock of infrastructure
are highly attractive because the relative performance of the competitors is
minored. This last problem is connected to the work of Holtz-Eakin et Lovely
30(1996) that study the impact of the infrastructure capital over economies of scale
and the variety of activities.
Conclusion
Introducing prior investment in an infrastructure capital in a problem of
competition between jurisdictions for the attraction of a large plant complexify
the resolution of the game because the investment choice of the jurisdiction are
interdependent, and for a given pair of investments, the objective function of
a jurisdiction changes depending on the outcome of the game. We exhibit the
condition under which we can characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game.
The outcome of the game depends on the relative size of the jurisdictions, the
magnitude of the economic e®ect induced by the location of the ¯rm but also
the adaptation of the infrastructure to the activity of the large ¯rm. The size
of a jurisdiction may predetermine the outcome of the game, but there exist
situations where the smallest jurisdiction can attract the large ¯rm if it invest
in a well specialized stock of infrastructure. Specialization of the infrastructure
capital can be a way for small jurisdictions to overcome their disadvantage with
larger jurisdictions. Two kinds of extensions can be considered.
The ¯rst extension of the model deals with the mobility of the local ¯rm. In
our model we have suppose that the local ¯rms are immobile. We can think that
the local ¯rms could react to the choice of the jurisdiction. They can react a priori
by selecting a jurisdiction anticipating the attraction policy of the jurisdiction. In
this setting the population of each jurisdiction is endogenously determined. The
local ¯rm cannot be mobile initially but can choose to leave the jurisdiction in
the view of the outcome of the game. This a posteriori mobility can be interesting
because the attraction policy can lead the jurisdictions to select an inducement
policy that can a®ect the pro¯t of the local ¯rms and change their localization
decision afterward.
The second extension deals with the nature of our model. We can think that
the attraction of a single ¯rm with a predetermined adaptation of the infrastructure
capital is extreme. If we consider that the jurisdictions face a continuum of ¯rms
and try to attract them with inducement policies based on infrastructure capital,
the strategic choice of the adaptation of the stock of infrastructure capital to the
activity of the attracted ¯rms can be viewed as a di®erentiation policy that tries to
limit the competition on the ¯nancial o®ers. Marketing policies based on thematic
developments observed in practice, can found a theoretical representation. For that
purpose a model like that of Salop (1979) can be useful to deal with this issues
and to gives some answers to the regulation of this market for territories.
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